This article brings together two different perspectives, dance and law, to ask questions about authorship and ownership in disabled dance. The focus is on Caroline Bowditch's short film project, A Casting Exploration, in which she is recast as the female dancer in a duet section from Joan Cleville's choreography for Scottish Dance Theatre, Love Games. We explore what medical law, human rights law and intellectual property law might say about Bowditch's role. We show how the film project raises questions about the aesthetic properties of the double duet, the politics of sameness and difference, and who can claim 'ownership' of the dance.
and difference, and the processes of translation of a dance from the able bodied to the disabled.
How might a viewer encounter a disabled dancer, particularly in the present context? Bowditch confronts this herself by asking, 'Can a disabled dancer cover an able bodied dancer?' 8 The resulting film is a potent intervention: a useful provocation about how we look at disabled dance.
The duet in Love Games explores the dynamics of a male/female relationship that is playful and affectionate. In the Murray version, moments of gentle touching, embracing and lyrical lifts and swoops are interspersed with more dynamic confrontations. The dancing is marked by an easy fluidity, a spirited youthfulness and athleticism as the dancers move through a sequence of intricate entanglements. Murray fits the image of the 'dancer's body'; she is longlimbed, long-haired and graceful, with a femininity that is highlighted by the male partner, who is the stronger of the two, and who supports her and lifts her with ease. It generally upholds many of the conventions of a typically hetero-normative duet. The recasting of Bowditch imposes a new frame, which blurs traditional gender roles. The female 'dancerly body' is refracted through the very different physicality of Bowditch, who dances in her wheelchair. In many ways the recasting is a clear example of how to 'translate' a role from one dancer to another, but in so doing it exposes much more about the politics of translation and adaptation within mainstream theatre dance. The opening moment sees each woman lifted into an embrace by the man. What is striking is that Bowditch is just over three feet tall, so she resembles a child when held by her partner. But this image quickly dissolves as the duet continues, and her confident physicality as a wheelchair dancer resists any reading of youth, innocence or dependence.
The emphasis on verticality and linearity in the first duet gives way; the man moves more into and from the floor to negotiate new ways to partner Bowditch in her wheelchair, who refuses to be his muse. Bowditch's wheelchair opens up a different kind of dialogue on the stage space.
Therefore, often a powerful signifier of disability/immobility, her wheelchair is now enabling, signifying mobility, independence and the power to support. Bowditch manoeuvres her chair with a technical virtuosity equal to the technical feats of the non-disabled dancers, integrating the chair into her dancing in a way that chimes with Ann Cooper Albright's description of Charlene
Curtiss's dancing:
[Curtiss] claims the chair as an extension to her own body [and] revises the cultural significance of the chair, expanding its legibility as a signal of the handicapped into a sign of embodiment. (Albright 1997: 83) Bowditch's chair acts as her partner, supporter and transporter. Her control of the chair diminishes the role of her male partner, thus making the male and female roles more equal.
Although Bowditch's recasting may not be aimed at gender re-balance, their roles are exchanged as the duo engage in quirky, fluid and playful 'love games'. At one point, Kerremans takes on what was Murray's role, appearing to nearly lose his balance, centre stage. Meanwhile Bowditch takes on Kerremans' role and wheels herself in a large circle, resolving with her catching his weight as he appears to fall back into her. As a reversal of the vulnerable woman saved by the man in Murray's version, Bowditch is the one who saves, refuting any suggestion of weakness.
Murray's version concludes with the rest of the ensemble entering and interrupting the duo onstage, and she moves away from her partner; Bowditch's ends with the duo alone on the stage. She turns first towards and then away from the audience and moves in a lilting pathway upstage as the man stands away, leaving the space to Bowditch. It has a wistful quality, but she seems neither forlorn nor abandoned.
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The two very different women's bodies viewed together in the film make each other more interesting. Variation in tone and amplitude is made more vivid; softly pedalling feet and subtle gestures and handholds are more visibly delicate and texturally layered in each of the paired films.
In short, it reinforces the differences between the women's roles while retaining the integrity of the choreographic intention. The film -with its two versions running simultaneously -also artist. She stakes her claim to be there by exposing the problematic assumption that disability cannot be playful and purposeful and that virtuosity is limited to particular dance practices and body types. Moreover, her performance might also be seen to contribute to a wider 'disability theatre aesthetic', which, according to Kirsty Johnston, 'challenges conventional representations of disability onstage, impacts the development process, and seeks to re-construct the social meanings of disability' (Johnston 2012: 173). Prefixing 'identity', 'politics', 'art' and 'culture' with the label 'disability' might reinforce difference, but that difference can be positive provided that it accepts and celebrates diversity of practice.
What the recasting means
Rather, the film and dance illustrate and address another issue that plagues 'disability dance': the inability to escape an inherent dualism that defines what it is. Forever trapped in the binary of disabled/non-disabled, inclusion/exclusion, object/subject, visible/invisible, dancers with impairments are disabled by categories such as 'integrated', that signal a different kind of performance experience for dance audiences; disabled dancers might rather seek to refute, challenge or remove this altogether. The simulcast in the film and Bowditch's recasting as the 'other' in Love Games might be said to reinforce an othering in its deviation from normalcy that so often cloaks the male/female duet form in dance. The recasting draws attention to Bowditch's uniqueness; she is a wheelchair dancer with a movement range that is determined and shaped by her unique bodily capacity. Indeed, Bowditch is not laying claim to the dance as 'her dance' but rather claims her place as dancer of 'the role' that honours her own embodied experience and yet exists beyond and separate from her. 11 Bearing these ambiguities in mind, we move to the section, which considers Bowditch's dance from a number of legal perspectives.
The dance of life (and law)
For present purposes, the legal perspective is important for a number of reasons. First, to what extent has the law contributed to the visibility of disabled artists through its treatment of physiological deviation from the norm. It casts impaired individuals as sufferers of a personal tragedy who must be treated (or otherwise brought more in line with the rather narrow characterization of 'normal' or 'healthy'), and it erects standards for decision-making and serviceproviding on that basis. Importantly, this medical model of person-identification and interaction, whereby we become, or become defined and constrained by, our physiological condition or limitation is widely adopted in society. According to this model, Bowditch would be seen as a 'patient' -possibly a patient who, given her potential need for ongoing support of a more technical or architectural nature, is beyond the existing remit of most health systems -or as a person who is 'not quite whole'.
However, social research with disabled populations has found that, rather than a demand for cures or prenatal screening programmes to identify birth defects, which are the occupational emphases within medicine, these populations exhibit a strong solidarity among communities with like impairments and a desire for a better situation (Goering 2008). All of this offers some clues as to why medical law has little resonance with disability.
In this pursuit of 'a better situation', medical law's theoretical/philosophical partner, bioethics, might be expected to play a larger role; bioethics is, after all, about 'ethics' as it relates to the 'biological'. Unfortunately, once again, little insight is forthcoming. To the extent that bioethics has addressed impairment and disability, it, like its more instrumental partner, has done so from a rather narrow value perspective to which it is itself blinkered (Koch 2006). Bioethicists have been criticized for either ignoring or misunderstanding disability and the rich literature that has emerged around it (Amundson and Tresky 2007, 2008) . Bioethical institutions have, it is argued, exhibited a reticence to accommodate impairment because it would be both burdensome to 'mainstream society' and also contrary to the fundamental conceptions of health and capacity at which health care is aimed (Amundson and Tresky 2008) . Such a reality has led to arguments that:
[W]e must overcome the idea that the study of ethical issues relating to disability must be left to the disabled alone. Although we should never seek to usurp the right to speak for any disenfranchised group, the failure to engage in dialogue with that group about issues of concern is a … serious problem. (Kuczewski 2001: 42) Despite this admonition, engagement with disability remains minimal, a sorry fact which we hope our work will rectify at least in some small part; our exploration of virtue and virtuosity could well be taken up as a means to expand the value base on which bioethics and the ethics of the body sit.
Human Rights law: Myopia?
The contribution of human rights might seem more promising, or at least relevant. As we noted at the outset, the right to participate in and to access culture and cultural works is recognized as a fundamental human right in international instruments (see note 1). 12 But when considered against A Casting Exploration, human rights law is revealed as a rather restricted system, which has not yet engaged with the new freedom that is seen in, and can come from the creativity of Bowditch.
A supporter of human rights law might consider this to be quite appropriate. Although many different theories, philosophies and declarations supporting human rights can be traced far back in time, 13 the present set of human rights instruments stem from the aftermath of World War II and a determination that obligations would be imposed on states to ensure that atrocities against humankind should not happen again.
14 From this perspective, it should not be expected that human rights would explicitly address questions of dance, disability, creativity and shifting boundaries. Likewise, some with disabilities face more significant daily challenges than those associated with the appreciation of or involvement in dance. 32 The ECJ stressed that the European copyright scheme (which is based on obligations in international treaties) provides that works are to be protected where the subject matter is original in the sense of being the author's intellectual creation; 33 what matters is not that something falls into a particular category or is given a particular name (e.g. dance), but that there is a work of the author's own intellectual creation. This development is unlikely to disturb the previous finding that a dramatic work has to be capable of being performed, 34 but it could bring more creations under copyright's protective mantle, which is likely in turn to be relevant to dance in its many potential forms. 35 2. Originality: The second criterion is that there must be the appropriate creative effort or originality present in the work. 36 Historically, the law only required that a work not be copied, but no more than skill, judgement or labour needed to be expended in its creation. 37 What skill is applied must be relevant to the work as it is expressed, rather than to the idea behind the work, which remains unprotectable. 38 Such was the low level of originality required in the United Kingdom that few works had been denied the status of a 'work' for want of originality. However, recent ECJ jurisprudence suggests that the originality requirement may be changing. A series of ECJ cases, taken together, means that the level has been raised (for the United Kingdom) to one of 'intellectual creation', whereby the author expresses her creative ability in an original manner by making free and creative choices and thus stamps her 'personal touch' on the work. 39 Where choices are dictated by technical considerations, rules or constraints, which leave no room for creative freedom, this criterion will not be met. 40 But in any event, law has little connection to debates within the dance community and beyond regarding the place of subjective aesthetic elements and views in determining what constitutes a dance.
Fixation:
The third requirement for copyright in the United Kingdom is that the work be fixed in some material form. 41 Traditionally, and reflecting the historical text-based roots of copyright law, fixation has been thought of as being in writing. 42 For dance, one of the notation systems such as Laban or Benesh might be deployed, both of which have relatively recent origins in the mid-twentieth century. 43 More modern examples of dance fixation might include film and video, computer animation, motion capture and holography. So what of the dance performed by Bowditch: does it meet the requirements for copyright protection? Considering the categories discussed above, we can say the following:
• The dance is clearly a 'work' for purposes of copyright law, and, if the category still exists, it is a work of dance.
• Creative ability has been applied and expressed in the work in an original manner through making free and creative choices.
• Whatever may be thought of the fixation requirement, this dance, or at least the parts that are available on YouTube, have been fixed in a form that is sufficient to meet the fixation criterion.
But who is the author? Who has expressed this creative ability and stamped their personal touch on the work?
Dance, copyright and authorship
There is a clear assumption in the dance community that the choreographer is the author and first owner of copyright in the work; this comes through in interviews with choreographers Choreography has been defined as the composition and arrangement of dance movements and patterns, whereas the dance itself (i.e. the performance) has been defined as static and kinetic successions of bodily movement in certain rhythmic and spatial relationships. 48 Choreography thus seems apt to be considered as a work and protected by copyright, but is that always the case?
It is reported that Joan Clevillé stated that his intention with Love Games was to 'translate the movement and the dramaturgy of the dance to a new body', and thus he focused on the emotional and physical intentions behind the movement rather than the form as originally conceived or expressed (2011). From the copyright perspective, this sounds more like the unprotectable idea than the protectable expression. Is there, then, authorial input into the performance of the work by Bowditch such as to render it capable of being protected by copyright?
Here the cases concerning copyright in music can be useful by analogy. In music, copyright can subsist in an original musical composition, 49 and a separate copyright can exist in an arrangement of the composition so long as the correct type of originality has been expended.
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While there remains a question over unprotectable choreographic ideas and protectable expression, the above-offered definition of choreography suggests that generally the tasks of composition and arrangement both fall to the choreographer. While the choreographer may compose the dance, why can the dancer not be considered as an arranger of that composition? The dance may be 'placed on the body' by the choreographer, 51 but is there not room for authorial intent by the dancer in the arrangement of the dance through her body sufficient for copyright?
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We think, yes. This is particularly so if we look at Bowditch's virtuoso interpretation (in copyright terms -arrangement) of the dance; she interprets Clevillé's choreographic intent (in copyright terms composition), but the result is visibly different from that performed by Murray; Bowditch's personal touch is stamped on her arrangement of the dance on her body in Love Games.
At this point it is instructive to note that copyright law has nothing to say about disability in authorship. 53 It treats all authors the same, looking only for authorial input sufficient to satisfy the legal tests. But in juxtaposing those legal tests with the very particular contribution made to
Love Games, we believe that the claim that Bowditch is the author of the work in the arrangement is strengthened precisely because she is disabled: only Bowditch is capable of contributing the intellectual creation necessary to make this dance a success, because only Bowditch knows precisely how her body can interpret and fix (arrange) the choreographic intent. 54 Bowditch's somatic knowledge is uniquely her own. A choreographer would struggle to give directions to her on how to achieve a particular outcome: how could a choreographer give instructions to Bowditch to express exuberance for example? A jump to express this emotion would be possible for the able-bodied dancer, but not for Bowditch. Copyright law is blind to Bowditch's subjective intention only to 'cover' the role and deaf to her claim that she is not the legal author of the copyright in the arrangement of the dance, with Cleville being the legal author of the copyright in the composition.
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What would the consequences be of these arguments? Ownership of copyright flows from authorship: the first owner of the copyright in a work is an author unless there is an employment arrangement or an agreement to the contrary. Copyright is a property right and thus with ownership come rights (and responsibilities) and powers (and obligations). Once the law recognizes ownership, applying the principles discussed, it does not distinguish between different types of owner. Therefore, Bowditch's ownership of the copyright in the arrangement of the dance is equal to Cleville's ownership of the copyright in the composition. This equality could be an important factor in the transition from exclusion and othering to inclusion and normalcy. This could then result in the transition from the marginalization of dance made by disabled people to the embracing of the art form and recognition of the (disabled) dancer as a valued and valuable participant in and an equal owner of our cultural heritage.
Conclusion
The disabled dancer often finds herself in a paradoxical position where she wants to be viewed on her own terms without being defined by her disability, equal to and the same as any other company dancer. Yet it is also clear that her disability might become for her a political act, a radical statement about the legitimacy of otherness within a performing art form that so easily reverts to a classical aesthetic; thus, her disabled body must remain visibly different. Moreover, in the case of Bowditch's role with SDT, the proscenium arch stage within the culture of a mainstream repertory dance company is replete with convention that dictates the way in which the dance is viewed. Within this aesthetic framework, it is inescapable that the disabled dancer will be viewed as other. Yet Bowditch's project acts as an interstice, forcing the viewer to pause and question these dualities and how they shape the way we look at and judge the dance. Arnold 2010). 51 We are using this idea in a general sense; we acknowledge that a choreographer's relationship with her dancers is very varied and the dance may emerge through diverse methods of sourcing, generating and shaping movement material.
52 Most choreographers will encourage the dancers to 'own the movement' as a way of ensuring a transfer of the intent from choreographer to performer. 53 For an exposition on the way in which copyright law treats the visually impaired, see Charlotte Waelde et al. (2013) . 54 Note that the argument is not that a non-disabled dancer cannot be an author: it is rather that Bowditch's claim to authorship in this case is strong and made more compelling because it is Bowditch who 'composes' the double film, arguably existing as a new artefact in its own terms. 55 The same arguments about the arrangement of the dance and authorship of the arrangement can equally be made for non-disabled dancers who are given the space by the choreographer to 'stamp their own intellectual touch' on the dance. In other words, the argument is not specific to the disabled dancer. 56 The review appeared in Vancouver Sun, 20 May 1999. Scott commented with a specific reference to company member David Toole; 'There is a horrific, Satyricon quality to Candoco that heaves up in the chest -nausea at the moral rudderlessness of a world where we would pay money to watch a man whose body terminates at his ribcage, moving about the stage on his hands' (Smith 2005: 80) .
